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Summary
In many ways, the process of europeanization has been running parallel to 
other processes, most prominently, that of globalization. While it appears that 
many of the changes, we see in the political landscapes of the member states 
can be attributed to the impact of the eu, it may also be the case that these are 
brought about by increased economic interdependence. the rise in populari-
ty of niche parties and a hollowing out of alternatives with regard to econom-
ic policies are two of the most prominent effects that are found to be corre-
lated with an increased participation in european integration. In this paper, I 
am assessing these claims against the alternative hypothesis, which places the 
causal power with globalization in general, rather than the integration specif-
ic to europe. By employing matching techniques, I am providing a cleared pic-
ture of the dependence of the above mentioned domestic political outcomes 
on the parallel and often confounding processes of europeanization and glo-
balization.
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party polarization, party fractionalization
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european union is a large enough factor to be able to influence the calculus 
of rational actors, and yet, the evidence of impact on domestic politics is 
mixed. More specifically, the party systems of the eu member states ought 
to be the institutions most likely affected by increase in breadth and depth 
of european integration. the eu adds a qualitatively different character-
istic to the process of integration its members are going through. the single 
market that is being created is in part an extension of the liberalization 
process, something that has been present across the globe, as countries 
increasingly open up and take part in the global economy. However, the 
segment that makes european integration qualitatively different is found in 
the extensive set of institutions that govern and regulate the single market, 
that add layers of supra-national representation to the citizens, and that 
transfer power and sovereignty away from the nation states, and into the 
hands of the european institutions.
However, european countries are not just taking part in the process 
of regional integration but are often at the forefront of attempts at global 
integration. If one is to discern the effects that the eu has on politics in the 
member states, one ought to also make sure that these are not confounded 
with the effects of globalization. In this paper, I examine two features of 
domestic party systems, party system fractionalization, and its polariza-
tion. the former concerns the number and relevance of political parties 
that are represented in parliament, while the other concerns the policy 
distance between the major parties.
Below, I discuss the use of matching in order to create a dataset of 
country-year cases which includes democracies that are similar in wealth 
and political institutionalization, but which include european countries 
and non-european countries. this is done so that the european cases can 
be compared to similar countries outside europe and therefore outside the 
eu’s immediate influence. I show the process of matching european and 
non – european cases on these two criteria and continue with regression 
analysis to determine whether the effects of europeanization differ from 
those of globalization.
My argument is that the process of european integration has an effect 
that extends beyond modernization and globalization, and that it has 
produced significant effects in the member states, and more specifically, 
in their party systems. these processes have simultaneously added and 
removed issues from the political menus parties and voters can choose 
from. For example, monetary policy has been transferred into the hands of 
the european Central Bank for the eurozone countries and all eu members 
have relinquished control over trade agreements to the european Commis-
sion. this changes the menu of options that are available to the govern-
ments, and to the political parties that are in government or seek to be 
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in government. additionally, their ability to campaign on issues that are 
no longer in their remit is restricted, as any promises related to policy 
areas that are no longer (solely) in the hands of national governments are 
no longer credible. While both globalization and europeanization (i.e. 
the effect of the eu on the member states) alter the menu of options for 
political parties that seek to be credible (or at least seek to shield them-
selves from the accusation that they are not credible), european integra-
tion takes the matter further than is the case for most comparable coun-
tries, which ought to be reflected in the ways that the political parties and 
consequently, the party systems, respond to the opportunities and pres-
sures of european integration and globalization, respectively
1. europeanization or globalization?
While the process of european integration is a multidimensional one, by 
far the most prominent of its segments has been economic integration. 
this is the area of integration that many see first-hand, predominantly 
reflected in the existence of the economic and Monetary union and a 
common currency, but also in the removal of tariffs, ability to move across 
borders for work, and in the relative equalization of standards for goods 
and services across all member states. the movement of capital across 
national borders remains less visible to most but is nevertheless a crucial 
element of european integration. the general understanding is that the eu 
is one of the great institutional achievements of our time, and yet much of 
its practical implications are fairly similar to those experienced by the rest 
of the globalized world. at the core of the european project lie the four 
freedoms: free movement of goods, services, capital and labor. In a global 
economy, it is not just the eu that is dropping the barriers to free move-
ment of these four factors of production. the World trade organization 
has contributed to a global lowering of tariffs among its members, and 
the policies of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have 
contributed to the opening up of the capital markets and institutionali-
zation of independent central banking across the world. on top of these 
rather obvious suspects in globalization, there is a whole “spaghetti bowl” 
of regional, multilateral, and bilateral trade organizations/treaties, and a 
multitude of bilateral investment treaties. Capital moves quite successfully 
across borders, in the form of large investments, and in the form of small 
but numerous remittances sent by migrant workers to their families.
the existing research finds that there is some effect of globalization on 
domestic politics but does not go into a discussion concerning the effect 
of “europe” on top of it. Kayser (2009) used political and economic indi-
cators from the eurobarometer surveys to show that there is indeed such a 




waves were found to be dependent on the international business cycle that 
similarly affected the analyzed countries. Hellwig (2014) discusses the ways 
in which globalization, more specifically, economic globalization, affects 
domestic politics, and political representation and sovereignty in partic-
ular. Similarly, Hellwig and ezrow (2014) suggest that “just as globalization 
puts pressure on [government] actions, [they] maintain that it also compli-
cates party competition”.1 While these findings refute the null hypothesis 
of no outside influence on domestic politics, they do not disentangle the 
effects of regional integration from those of globalization. Following a 
similar argument, Colantone and Stanig (2018b) and Colantone and Stanig 
(2018a) show that the effects of exposure to international trade, specifi-
cally to import competition from China, can have grave consequences for 
national politics.
In the most abstract sense, the main tenets of european integration 
look quite like what the rest of the world is experiencing: opening up of 
markets, increased freedom of movement for goods, services, capital, 
and labour, and adoption of global standards1 in various industries, and 
proliferation of similar institutional features in regulation of markets (e.g. 
see Bernhard (2002) regarding the spread of the institution of the inde – 
pendent central bank). How is european integration different from what 
everyone else is experiencing? the difference is both qualitative and quan-
titative: the eu does more of liberalization of markets across the borders of 
its member states, and it engages in types of integration that do not exist 
elsewhere. For example, while the Wto rounds have brought tariffs to 
record lows, they have not yet been eliminated from global trade. In that 
sense, european integration is quantitatively different from globalization. 
While the reduction of tariffs is important for easing global trade, it does 
little to eliminate non – tariff barriers to trade, in the form of market regu-
lation, differing technical standards, and a plethora of health and safety 
standards. the eu, however, deals with all of these, and more which makes 
european integration qualitatively different from the processes of globali-
zation. these are, of course, just the simplest examples of the differences 
between globalization and european integration. the eu does so much 
more than allow for a single market for goods among its 28 members. It 
has created a layer of institutions at the supranational level, and in the 
process shifted the decision-making power in numerous policy areas to 
this supranational level. While the debate on the success or failure of its 
democratic institutions continues, their very existence distinguishes the 
eu from all other attempts at integration, making the project unique in 
scope and level of success.
1  For various arguments on the mechanisms through which (economic) globalization affects 
domestic politics, see Kayser (2007).
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For the europeanization literature, the ability of the eu to affect 
domestic politics seems self-evident. the research questions then become 
those of mechanisms and magnitude of these effects. numerous authors 
have noted the rise of fringe parties as a function of european integration 
(Mudde, 2007; Meguld, 2010; art, 2007, 2011; McGann, 2005), and recent 
events surrounding the crisis of the common currency suggest that the 
success of governments and outcomes of elections depend more and more 
on the way european integration is perceived by voters and addressed by 
politicians and political parties (de vries and edwards, 2009; de vries, 
2010; Schoen, 2008; jolly, 2007). this literature has been rather successful 
at showing that there is in fact a large degree of connectedness between 
the european and the domestic levels. thus Schoen (2008) shows that 
the decisions voters made in German elections had been influenced by 
their views on turkey’s accession to the eu, and tillman (2004) finds that 
the decisions in national elections in Finland, Sweden and austria at the 
time of their eu accession had been affected by the accession process. 
Caramani et al. (2011) show that there has indeed been some convergence 
across european party systems, while nanou (2013) show the european 
integration has had an impact on the incidence of euroscepticism. Simi-
larly, dorussen and nanou (2006) demonstrate that there has been euro-
peanization of party policy across borders of nation states.
all these processes provide both constraints and opportunities for polit-
ical actors. europeanization, however, also provides opportunities for polit-
ical entrepreneurs to engage with and on an additional level of govern-
ment. additionally, the visibility and prominence of the eu made it a more 
easily identifiable part of the political structure. one of the opportuni-
ties that arose for political parties was the ability to present the process 
of integration to the voters, an opportunity that they in fact misused, by 
often treating the eu as a scapegoat for failed policies, and not giving it 
credit when it was due. Mair (1999) notes that the parties have reduced 
the choice for the voters by mixing the messages about what arenas of 
competition are appropriate for particular grievances: the protest against 
national governments and policies, and the extent of european integra-
tion became issues in eP elections. Both of these, Mair argues, ought to 
have been directed at national governments that have a say in the process 
of furthering integration and that can be “kicked out” in national elec-
tions. another instance of european integration providing opportuni-
ties to political actors in member states is found by Somer-topcu and Zar 
(2013), whose research indicates that eP elections have an effect on polit-
ical parties’ calculus in the national election. Parties do use eP election 
results as sources of information on how much policy-change they are to 




thus provided political parties with an additional source of information, 
and an additional arena for competition (and perks).
How should we think about the effect of taking part in european inte-
gration on the domestic politics in the member states? I argue that euro-
pean integration affects the calculus of both parties and voters. on the one 
hand, it removes a substantial portion of political issues to the suprana-
tional legislative level or places important decisions in the hands of inde-
pendent bodies. an example of the former is market regulation in various 
economic sectors – the matters once decided by member state parliaments 
are now decided in the eu’s ordinary legislative procedure. regarding the 
latter, one ought only to look at monetary policy that is in the hands of the 
european Central Bank, or trade policy, which is negotiated by the euro-
pean Commission for the whole of eu, on behalf of the member states. 
this, I argue, following Mair (2014), leads to a hollowing out of political 
competition on the traditional left-right dimensions. the maneuvering 
space for governments is reduced, as is the space within which the oppo-
sition may form credible alternatives. If there is one effect that we ought 
to expect from european integration, it is the reduction in polarization, as 
the options before political actors diminish.
european integration has indeed become an everyday issue in political 
news in each of the member states. as argued by Hooghe and Marks (2009), 
this is no longer an area in which political elites can do as they please, and is 
instead becoming an area of fierce competition. at the very least, european 
integration ought to be leading to an increase in party system fractionaliza-
tion and number of political parties because challengers should be pointing 
out that europe is a contested issue, and voters could well be recognizing it 
as such. this is also what a glance at european newspapers may suggest: new 
contenders placing the eu at the forefront of their grievances, as seen in the 
uK by uKIP and the Brexit Party, in Italy by the Five Star Movement and the 
League, in Greece by Syriza, in France by the national Front. However, there 
may also be an effect of the shifting of party competition. If the traditional 
left-right is getting narrower, other issues may become salient as parties seek 
a niche they can use to appeal to voters. Finally, there should also be an effect 
of the eu on the increase in success of sub-national and ethnoregionalist 
parties, as argued by jolly (2007, 2015) and Hajer (2011). these too should be 
contributing to an increase in fractionalization in countries taking part in 
european integration.
H1: as a country’s embeddedness in the process of european integra-
tion increases, the polarization on the issues that are part of the left-right 
dimension will be decreasing.
H2: the number of parties and party system fractionalization in the 
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essentially, I expect that the various elements of european integration 
would be statistically significant and negative in the case of polarization, 
positive in the case of fractionalization.
the literatures on globalization and europeanization both offer expla-
nations and claim significant effects of their relevant independent varia-
bles on political outcomes within the borders of nation states. While it is 
plausible that both europeanization and globalization are relevant, it is 
worthwhile knowing whether these processes have any differing effects 
at the systemic level of a democratic polity. From a europeanist’s point of 
view the issue becomes that of testing whether european integration has 
an effect on domestic politics that is independent of globalization. the 
following section discusses the methodological challenges and a proposed 
solution for testing these hypotheses.
2. data and modeling strategy
the study of europeanization is certainly an area of political science where 
many of our problems in research design come to the fore. to an ever 
greater extent, the problem of europeanization’s effects is becoming an “n 
of 1” problem. the eu has continuously been in the process of expansion 
and is now either encompassing or very closely cooperating with nearly all 
of the european countries. the cases of european democracies that have 
nothing, or at least very little to do with the eu are non-existent. Coun-
tries that are not members typically have strong economic and political ties 
with the eu. norway and Switzerland, for example, are part of the euro-
pean economic area, and are implementing many of eu’s policies without 
seeking membership. Countries such as Serbia or Macedonia are actively 
engaged in becoming members. even the european micro-states take part: 
vatican, Monaco, San Marino all take part in the eMu. no matter where 
one looks, the eu is at least in part active. For democracies in europe, there 
is no escaping the eu.
this is a set of serious research design problems. First, with the eu’s 
great involvement in integration of europe, there is no control group 
that would allow the testing of any theory regarding the effects of the 
eu. Looking at the treatment group only means that we may find corre-
lation at best, an educated guess at worst, but cannot get any closer to a 
convincing causal argument. related to that, any explanation is poten-
tially harboring spuriousness. Whatever we may be seeing as regularities 
in european countries may well have its source in something completely 
different (like, globalization, or modernization, processes that european 
democracies are certainly parts of).
empirically disentangling europeanization and globalization is not 




observable implications. For example, when we observe change on the 
measure of trade dependence (trade as proportion of GdP) in an eu 
member state, we know that this country’s economy is now more inte-
grated with other economies, but it is hard to tell whether this is a result of 
globalization (for example, due to new trade deal that the eu has made) or 
a result of europeanization (due to ease of commercial exchange between 
european countries). this is further complicated by the difficulties in sepa-
rating the export and import from various countries due to the applica-
tion of rules of origin, making the changes in imports from and exports to 
particular groups of countries a problematic measure. to illustrate: if an 
eu company is able to assemble a product, sell it in another eu country, it 
may be simultaneously benefitting from both the globalized market (e.g. 
for a component made in China which has a small enough added value 
for it to not change the status of the final product as eu-made) and the 
ability to sell the completed items in the eu’s single market. Some poten-
tial for disentangling the effects exists at sub-national level, where a more 
finely grained analysis can be conducted, as for example, in Colantone 
and Stanig (2018a) piece that showed that those areas of the uK where 
there was greater competition to local industries from Chinese imports 
were also the areas where the proportion of voters that voted to leave the 
eu was higher.
What one is interested in is whether a variation on the independent 
variable correlates in the variation on the dependent variable. For most 
european countries, the variation on the main independent variables 
(those related to european integration) never includes the possibility of 
complete isolation from european integration. Most european democra-
cies are either eu member states or are very closely integrated with the eu 
(such as the examples of norway or Switzerland, or countries that are part 
of the accession process, such as Serbia or north Macedonia). therefore, in 
any of them, separating a measure of europeanization from that of globali-
zation becomes a difficult task. For an adequate test of europeanization’s 
influence on party system indicators, one may envisage a set of countries 
that are europe-like in terms of democracy and development (which also 
tends to correlate with a level of globalization), but not integrated with 
eu’s many systems of cooperation. When such countries are included, one 
may see whether european integration is really what separates the euro-
pean countries from those which are similar. Globalization and europeani-
zation work in the same direction, but if europeanization is truly different 
from globalization, its effects should be clearly seen when european coun-
tries are compared with similarly globalizing wealthy democracies. non-
european wealthy democracies are true instances of zero on the european-
ization measures and as such provide cases that contribute to meaningful 
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variation on the independent variables but are limited so that they may 
be truly comparable.
the issue is simply that, if testing the hypothesis on european cases 
alone, one may find a correlation between european integration-related 
variables and the party system-related dependent variables. However, as 
european integration is happening alongside globalization, and through 
some same mechanisms (such as increased pressures from exposure to 
trade competition), it becomes difficult to say whether the effect of the eu 
is what is being seen, or just the effect of globalization manifested in the 
eu-related variables. Given the eu’s wide-ranging trade deals and general 
openness to the global economy, the most europeanized among the euro-
pean democracies are also the most globalized. Luckily (or unfortunately, 
depending on one’s criteria for assessment), we are unable to impose labo-
ratory conditions on countries and afflict one set with integration while the 
control group remains untouched by the same process. one of the most 
prominent and popular quasi-experimental approaches in political science 
in regression discontinuity design (angrist,2009) is impossible to imple-
ment, first due to limits of available data, and because the “treatment” of 
integration engulfs all european democracies in one way or another. the 
only cases that are not in any way attached to the eu are also those that 
are completely uninteresting from a point of view of competitive demo-
cratic politics (e.g. Belarus).
the promise of the matching techniques is that it enables us to look 
beyond the narrow confines of europe and maybe find cases that are 
similar enough to the european ones but have not been exposed to inte-
gration in the same way or the same extent that the european countries 
have been. these matched cases may then play the part of the “control 
group”. In this paper, I use matching as a way to create a coarse quasi-
experimental set of country-cases that are all democracies of a certain 
level of development, with the aim of discerning the extent to which the 
two domestic systemic outcomes I am interested in, fractionalization and 
polarization, are affected by european integration, as opposed to globali-
zation. Matching is, in essence, comparable to the qualitative approach 
of selecting most similar cases (nielsen,2016). In making the choice to 
rely on matching european countries with similar non-eu countries, I am 
following the advice on disentangling the effects of the eu proposed by 
Haverland (2006) and nielsen (2016).
there is some debate about the proper way to utilize the matching 
procedure, and here I am following the advice provided by Ho et al.(2011) 
and Gelman and Hill (2006), and using matching as a first step before 
undertaking a well-known and relatively simple regression analysis. the 




certainly not panacea for the problems of research design utilizing obser-
vational data. Indeed, arceneaux et al. (2006) show that matching alone, 
applied to data on voter mobilization, provides biased estimates that 
perform no better than a simple oLS. However, they use matching to 
compare the randomly selected observations from the treatment group 
with the randomly selected observations from the control group, and do 
not use the resulting data in further analyses.
the data for this paper come from a new archive compiled and collected 
by Graham and tucker (2017). this International Political economy data 
resource (IPedr) compiles data from the most commonly used 51 existing 
global country-year datasets and provides a single data source, reducing the 
potential for errors in merging data for individual projects and increasing 
the ease of including new or alternative measures in statistical anal-
yses. Graham and tucker (2017) note that the specific benefit of this new 
resource is that it allows a greater ease of including alternative measures 
for some of the most commonly used variables.
In this paper, I am using only a small subset of the IPedr. two main 
criteria were used for selecting cases: time and democratic status. Since 
the paper concerns the problems of europeanization and globalization, I 
have selected the year 1979 as the starting year. there are two main reasons 
why this year is a good breaking point. First, it is the year of the first direct 
elections of members of the european Parliament, signifying a shift in the 
relevance of the eu for both parties and voters. Prior to that year, euro-
pean integration was truly just a matter of elite politics. Second, in 1979 
the global economy is already en route to further liberalizations, after the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods currency system in 1973 and the subse-
quent oil crises. Furthermore, some of the starkest examples of globalizing 
economy affecting particular countries take place after the 1970s: monetary 
policy turn in the uS, the French u-turn of the 1980s, and the debt crises 
of the 1980s. all of these are precursors to the series of debt and currency 
crises that have been demonstrating the power that shifts in the global 
economy have over nation states.
the second selection criterion is somewhat more straightforward. Since 
the dependent variables I am interested in are features of party systems, 
countries that are not democracies and thus do not have party competi-
tion and as a result, do not have party systems either, simply fall out of 
the universe of relevant cases. the variable used to subset the data was 
the country’s Polity score: only those with a score of 6 or more remained 
in the sample. Subsetting the data on these criteria yielded a dataset with 
1853 observations. the two dependent variables come from the database 
of Political institutions (dPI) (Beck and Katz 2001). the first one, legis-
lative fractionalization, varies between a theoretical minimum of 0 and a 
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theoretical maximum of 1. the measure indicates the probability that two 
randomly selected members of the relevant legislative body are not from 
the same political party. thus, a legislative body in which all members 
come from the same party would receive a score of zero, and that in which 
all members come from different parties would receive a score of one. the 
actual data occupy the space between these two extremes.
While the fractionalization measure is relatively non-controversial, the 
other variable I consider in this paper has provoked more debate. Polariza-
tion, or the extent to which the policy prescriptions of the major parties in 
a party system differ, may be measured in various ways. the dPI approach 
is very simple, as it only notes whether the executive is on the left (score 
of 3), right (score of 1), or in the political center (score of 2) and does the 
same for the main opposition party. all of these are related to the economic 
left – right dimension, and do not take into account the potential for the 
parties to differ on other issues. the polarization score is simply the differ-
ence between the executive and opposition’s scores. While truly simple and 
straightforward, this measure may be obscuring the differences among 
parties, and the scale and extent of these differences. However, the dPI 
codebook notes a relatively high degree of agreement with the data by 
Huber and Inglehart (1995).2
I have opted against using the Chapel Hill expert Survey (CHeS) 
(Bakker et al. 2015) data in the paper. this dataset provides detailed data 
on party positions, and can be used to calculate polarization scores similar 
to the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (volkens et al. 2015) data. 
Given the design of this paper, I chose to rely on variables found in the 
database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). While the CHeS and 
CMP provide detailed data, they do not have the scope needed to address 
the countries in the matched dataset: CHeS only starts in 1999, and covers 
european countries only; the CMP data stretch back for a longer period 
of time, but primarily focus on european countries, with some availability 
of oeCd countries and Latin america. the design of this paper focused 
on including non-european countries in order to test whether the party 
2  this choice of the dependent variable in the polarization model is somewhat contro-
versial, with the alternative provided by dalton (2008) being the most likely contender to 
replace the used measure. this measure is based on the right-left measure provided in the 
Manifesto Project dataset (volkens et al. 2015). Gabel and Huber(2000) noted that pooling 
left-right data by country is problematic when calculating and correcting individual party 
scores – since thedalton (2008) measure of polarization does the same by adding up the thus 
corrected party scores, this issue may appear in his measure. Furthermore, by taking into 
account the party vote shares, it also introduces an element of the other measures used in the 
model, those of fractionalization and Herfindahl indexes, thus increasing collinearity of the 
left and right hand sides of the regression equations. the existing dPI variable is chosen with 
all these controversies in mind, and is used mostly because it performs well when compared 




system outcomes in question are present in cases of countries that are 
similar to european ones in terms of wealth and level of democracy, but 
which are not found in europe. the dPI provided less granular data, but 
encompassing more countries and a longer time period. additionally, the 
fractionalization measure as available in the dPI is consistently measured 
across country cases. theLaakso and taagepera (1979) measure of effective 
number of parties is reliably available for the countries encompassed by the 
CMP dataset, and I include results of a model of europeanization effect 
on this measure to show that, over a longer period of time, europeaniza-
tion does make a difference for the manner in which party systems func-
tion (see appendix, table 7). this model considers european cases only, as 
the effective number of parties measure could not be reliably sourced for 
the matched dataset used in this paper.
the independent variables are organized in three groups: the main 
variables of inter – est, concerning europeanization and globalization; insti-
tutional variables; economic and social variables. as was the case with 
the dependent variables, all come from the IPedr or the author’s own 
coding.
eu membership does not mean the same thing for different eu coun-
tries, which is why I use several dummies to grasp at least some of the multi-
dimensional nature of being an eu member. It is likely that eu member-
ship without participation in the eu’s most prominent projects, like the 
economic and Monetary union or the Schengen area, is not affecting the 
country as deeply as participation in the latter does. Similarly, one may 
expect the “original” six member states to be more deeply embedded in 
integration than the countries that have just recently joined.
the party system age variable accounts for the average age of polit-
ical parties in the legislature and comes from the dPI dataset. While it is 
the case that there is significant variation across individual parties, and 
some old parties tend to consistently do poorly while new parties capture 
significant shares of votes immediately upon establishment, this variable is 
aimed at capturing the overall legislature and the potential for the knowl-
edge and experience to be transferred across political generations. this is 
relevant for the manner in which the party system can deal with the pres-
sures and opportunities of both european integration and globalization. 
this is an imperfect measure, as it may misrepresent the extent to which 
political elites cycle from older to newer parties. However, it does capture 
the upheaval of newer parties joining the scene, even if their legislators 
have already been on the political scene for a longer time.
the other variables of interest concern globalization. trade dependence 
captures a country’s participation in the global economy and the poten-
tial for pressures that stem from it, as it measures the proportion of GdP 
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that total trade (imports+exports) takes up in a given year. However, trade 
alone does not capture these economic pressures, so I am also including 
a test for the relevance of currency crises in affecting domestic political 
outcomes. While a country can be part of the global economy without 
suffering a currency crisis, if one should occur, there would be no doubt 
about the process of globalization affection the national economy, and 
subsequently national politics.
the remaining variables are institutional and economic controls and 
are listed in the table below. Several of these deserve more attention. GdP 
per capita is a standard measure that (imperfectly) captures the level of 
wealth in a country. While there is no necessity in the relationship between 
political outcomes and wealth, the level of wealth does make a difference in 
how countries are dealing with the pressures and opportunities provided 
by their participation in the global economy. For example, Wibbels (2006) 
finds that there is a difference in how wealthy countries endure global 
crises: they are able to borrow in difficult times, which provides them with 
a cushion against social and political upheaval. When poorer countries 
are faced with a crisis, their borrowing costs are higher, which leads them 
to resort to spending cuts, often in areas related to social welfare. thus, 
accounting for wealth and currency crises allows one to control for the 
ability of the party system to compensate for pressures and to account for 
the presence of such pressures. the dummy variable for whether a country 
was considered rich in 2009 aims to account for the overall path that a 
country has taken in the global economy – i.e., it accounts for whether a 
country is a clear beneficiary of the process of globalization. the choice 
of year captures the point at which the financial crisis that started in 2008 
would have affected countries that were on the cusp of being considered 
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Matching is certainly not a definitive solution for the methodological 
issues that arise in this case. It is, however, one of many potential parts of 
a multi-pronged consideration of a research problem, which may lead to 
an increase in confidence in one’s results. Here, matching is conducted 
in r, using the “MatchIt” package by Ho et al. (2011). Given the nature of 
the data, exact matching was not an option, as it was unlikely that there 
would be any cases that exactly match those of the european democra-
cies. Instead, “genetic” matching was used, a procedure that uses “a genetic 
search algorithm to find a set of weights for each covariate such that the 
version of optimal balance is achieved after matching.” (Ho et al. 2011, 12) 
this procedure matches the cases with replacement, so it should be noted 
that some country-years may appear more than once in the data.
two major issues arose in implementation of matching on the orig-
inal dataset. the first one was that matching required a complete dataset. 
there are two solutions to the problem: either match on the variables that 
are both relevant and complete or use multiple imputation to complete the 
entire dataset. as will be seen below, I used both, with little effect on the 
results of the regressions. the second issue was that the nature of cases 
(country-years) makes it difficult to find similar pairs in the “treatment” 
and “control” groups, reducing the size of the matched dataset with each 
additional variable that the countries are matched on. a tentative solution 
to this problem is using only two key variables to match on and adding the 
remainder of variables of interest in the regression portion of analysis.
the cases were matched on two major criteria: GdP per capita and 
average age of major parties. these would be core features that countries 
would really need to be similar to the european countries on, and were 
the only ones finally chosen to stay part of the procedure. Inclusion of 
more variables drastically reduced sample size, and all the results and data 
presented below were created using matching on two variables. Since the 
core of the problem at hand is that countries that are similar to the euro-
pean ones are not very numerous, I used the “europe” dummy as the treat-
ment. the matching program, thus, looked for european and non-euro-
pean cases that are similar in terms of GdP per capita and average party 
age. the process created a dataset that included country-years from europe 
and outside it, and provided increased balance between the “treatment” 
and “control” groups.3 the list of countries that are included in the anal-
ysis can be found in the appendix.
Missing data pose another challenge for analyses of time-series cross-
section data. In this particular case, the proportion of missing data was 
3  the Q-Q plot of the variables that the data were matched on is in the appendix. It shows 





not large for the whole dataset, but it did bring about a reduction in the 
analyzed sample size since each of the variables was missing data in 
different rows.
In the manual for MatchIt, King et al. (Ho et al. 2011) recommend that 
the datasets with missing values be completed by using multiple impu-
tation. Following this advice, I used King et al.’s (King et al. 2001) amelia 
for r. the imputed data remained similar to the original, and the results 
of the models using imputation are reported below, not differing substan-
tially from those that used non-imputed data.4 
the analyses were conducted using simple ordinary least squares 
regression, unless otherwise noted.
3. results
In the tables below, two sets of results are presented. First, regressions 
with polarization and fractionalization as dependent variables that use the 
matched and incomplete data. Second, the same dependent variables, but 
utilizing the matched and imputed data.
as expected, the variables concerning european integration are shown 
to be statistically significantly correlated with the outcomes of interest, 
fractionalization and polarization. this particularly holds for eurozone/
eMu membership, a finding that is robust to alternative data (imputed 
and not imputed.) as expected, eMu membership decreases the level of 
polarization in a given country-year. However, the hypothesis of the oppo-
site effect on fractionalization is not confirmed.5 In fact, when compared to 
non-european countries, eMu membership is correlated with a decrease 
in fractionalization.
eu membership alone appears as statistically significant in the models 
with non – imputed data only. Where it reaches statistical significance, this 
variable “works” in the same way as eurozone membership does, corre-
lating with depressed polarization and fractionalization. In the alterna-
tive specification, the variable has a positive and non – significant effect. 
If anything, this shows that one ought to be conscious of the possibilities 
for alternative specifications and robustness tests. the lack of similar effect 
across the two sets of models,
While the eMu affects both polarization and fractionalization, the 
results indicate that fractionalization may have more to do with the process 
of globalization. Both trade dependence and the occurrence of currency 
4  the summary statistics for the original data, matched data, and matched and imputed 
data can be found in the appendix.
5  In an alternative specification of the model, which relies on a europe-only dataset, the 
finding is exactly opposite.
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crises have a statistically significant effect on fractionalization. this is a 
result that fits with the idea that globalization and participation in the 
global economy in particular create both pressures/constraints and oppor-
tunities for political actors in democracies. this result indicates that there 
may indeed be a practical consequence in the creation of viable parties that 
exploit these constraints and opportunities to get political representation. 
It appears to be the case that economic globalization and european inte-
gration have opposite effects on legislative fractionalization.
It appears that being part of the eMu will not lead to an increase in the 
probability that two randomly selected members of parliament come from 
different parties, but trade dependence and a currency crisis might. Since 
currency crises are relatively rare they may have more fleeting effects, and 
may be more relevant in conjunction with institutional or other economic 
variables. this is certainly an issue to explore in future work.
one of the surprises of these models was that taking part in the 
Schengen area had no discernible effect on either polarization or frac-
tionalization. Since being part of Schengen means that european coun-
tries stop conducting border controls among themselves, this ought to be 
seen as a major blow to the nation-state, and as such could have precipi-
tated challenges to the governments and the existing parties. It would be 
interesting to see whether future iterations of the data show a change in 
this result, given the prominence that political parties have been giving to 
the increased migration flows from africa and the Middle east over the 
past several years.
the two sets of models differ quite a bit in terms of the data they cover. 
the models without data imputation drop from 1085 cases created by the 
matching procedure to 581 and 652 cases for polarization and fractional-
ization models, respectively. ability to keep more of the information in 
the sample is certainly a plus for the imputed data, and ought to lend a bit 
more credence to the results obtained from these data.
In terms of total explained variance, all models are around the .2 mark, 
which is a solid result, given that the models omit much of the domestic 
context and focus predominantly on the variables concerning the interna-
tional context. the results in this paper ought to be tested in future work 





table 2. Models of polarization and fractionalization, matched non-imputed 






















Trade dependence −0.001 0.0005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0001)
Currency crisis 0.242 0.046∗
(0.266) (0.028)
Government stability 0.041∗ 0.001
(0.021) (0.002)
Electoral threshold 0.001 0.001
(0.013) (0.001)
Proportional rep. −0.097 0.018
(0.166) (0.022)







Residual Std. Error 0.773 (df = 566) 0.087 (df = 637)
F Statistic 12.205∗∗∗ (df = 14; 566)
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Trade dependence −0.0001 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0001)
Currency crisis −0.175 0.041∗∗
(0.187) (0.019)
Government stability 0.001 0.0001
(0.016) (0.002)
Electoral threshold 0.016∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.001)







Residual Std. Error 0.981 (df = 1071) 0.088 (df = 1070)





4. discussion and further steps
I argue that party systems have indeed been affected by eu’s existence and 
development. european countries have been hit by europeanization in a 
way that is in parts not fundamentally different from the way everyone has 
been hit by globalization. However, they have been affected more inten-
sely, with european integration taking many of elements of globalization 
and amplifying them.
However, the eu brings with it a new layer of political engagement, 
and a shift of power and sovereignty to the supranational level that exceeds 
anything that we see as part of the processes of globalization and moderni-
zation. In that sense, regional integration in europe is producing a distinct 
set of consequences for domestic politics of countries involved. this is 
particularly true for party systems, as outcomes of complex stable strategic 
interactions between parties and voters, and among parties themselves.
even though the results fail to confirm both hypotheses, the statisti-
cally significant effect of eu-related variables on party system features even 
when accounting for global processes remains a relevant finding. However, 
the exact opposite of the expected result concerning fractionalization, 
namely that european integration features contribute to its depression 
rather than the expected increase, warrant further research. this ought 
to mean both quantitative work that would challenge and test the robust-
ness of these findings to different measures and specifications, and quali-
tative work examining the mechanisms through which european integra-
tion may be encouraging or discouraging new political actors. this finding 
may also be resulting from the differences between the european and non-
european settings. the matched dataset included some countries that are 
similar in terms of wealth and level of democracy but have historically had 
both open economies and low number of political parties (such as the uS 
and australia). this is a matter that ought to be considered in detailed case 
studies that account for local contexts, actors, institutions, and the manner 
in which they interact with pressures (and opportunities) that stem from 
participation in the global economy.
Perhaps the major issue that needs to be resolved in continuing this 
line of research is that of measurement. the debate on the polarization 
measure is still ongoing, with much potential for the use of the various 
measures proposed here in checking the robustness of this paper’s findings. 
the next step will be to expand an existing measure based on the Mani-
festo Project data (volkens et al. 2015) to the countries beyond europe. this 
measure offers more variety and nuance than the dPI measure and should 
also produce a higher level of validity and reliability of the findings.
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Finally, in order to ensure that the underlying mechanisms are discern-
ible, these results should be further substantiated in detailed case studies 
of particular countries, both within and outside europe.
even so, these results suggest that there is indeed a difference in the way 
that european integration, as opposed to globalization, affects democracies 
at the systemic level. the elements of party systems discussed here, frac-
tionalization and polarization, certainly appear to be affected by the insti-
tutional and economic context at the global and regional levels.
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Sažetak
Kako raspetljati europeizaciju i globalizaciju?  
Procjena utjecaja europske unije na stranačke sustave  
država članica
Proces europeizacije se u mnogim aspektima zbivao istovremeno s drugim pro-
cesima, poglavito s procesom globalizacije. Iako se čini da upravo europskoj 
uniji možemo pripisati promjene kojima svjedočimo u političkim krajolicima 
država članica, moguće je i da su one posljedica povećane ekonomske međuovi-
snosti, odnosno globalizacije. rast popularnosti stranaka novih političkih niša 
i nepostojanje alternative postojećim ekonomskim politikama dva su najvažni-
ja ishoda koja koreliraju s većom uključenošću države u procese europske inte-
gracije. u članku autorica analizira ove tvrdnje suprotstavljajući ih alternativ-
noj hipotezi da je uzročnik spomenutih promjena globalizacija općenito, a ne 
integracije koje su specifične samo za europu. Koristeći tehnike „uparivanja”, 
autorica daje jasniju sliku povezanosti spomenutih političkih posljedica s isto-
vremenim i često isprepletenim procesima europeizacije i globalizacije.
Ključne riječi: europeizacija, globalizacija, eu integracija, stranački sustavi, 
stranačka polarizacija, stranačka frakcionalizacija.
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table 4. Summary statistics for the initial dataset
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Table 4: Summary statistics for the initial dataset
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Fractionalization 1,826 0.660 0.147 0.000 0.930
Year 1,853 1,998.597 8.994 1,980 2,012
Polarization 1,648 0.939 0.930 0 2
Government stability 1,530 7.885 1.785 1.000 11.125
Electoral threshold 1,374 2.518 3.562 0.000 25.000
EU member 1,853 0.287 0.453 0 1
Euro 1,853 0.099 0.299 0 1
Currency crisis 1,556 0.028 0.164 0 1
Rich in 2009 1,853 0.495 0.500 0 1
EU member 1,853 0.066 0.248 0 1
EU membership length 1,853 1.657 7.799 0 59
Schengen 1,853 0.029 0.167 0 1
Eurozone 1,853 0.016 0.126 0 1
GDP/capita 1,853 16,162.050 16,392.040 249.104 86,127.240
Inﬂation 1,760 26.368 240.749 −4.480 7,481.664
Trade as % GDP 1,849 77.437 42.212 12.009 352.904
Proportional representation 1,841 0.788 0.409 0 1
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table 5. Summary statistics for matched data
Table 5: Summary statistics for matched data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Year 1,085 1,998.134 9.161 1,980 2,012
GDP/capita 1,085 23,626.450 16,654.390 570.100 86,127.240
Average party age 1,085 43.154 33.834 1.000 155.000
EU member 1,085 0.496 0.500 0 1
Europe 1,085 0.822 0.383 0 1
Inﬂation 1,054 20.693 163.997 −4.480 3,373.474
Trade as % of GDP 1,081 85.022 45.697 14.391 352.904
Proportional representation 1,082 0.872 0.334 0 1
Electoral threshold 914 3.286 3.966 0.000 25.000
Fractionalization 1,071 0.693 0.115 0.000 0.927
Polarization 969 1.139 0.904 0 2
Government stability 898 8.130 1.633 1.000 11.083
Currency crisis 923 0.018 0.135 0 1
Rich in 2009 1,085 0.720 0.449 0 1
EU membership length 1,085 2.976 10.273 0 59
Schengen 1,085 0.053 0.223 0 1





table 6. Summary statistics for matched and imputed data
Table 6: Summary statistics for matched and imputed data
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Year 1,085 1,998.134 9.161 1,980 2,012
GDP/capita 1,085 23,626.450 16,654.390 570.100 86,127.240
Average party age 1,085 43.154 33.834 1.000 155.000
EU member 1,085 0.496 0.500 0 1
Europe 1,085 0.822 0.383 0 1
Inﬂation 1,085 23.209 170.462 −449.182 3,373.474
Trade as % of GDP 1,085 85.192 45.718 14.391 352.904
Proportional representation 1,085 0.871 0.336 −0.219 1.300
Electoral threshold 1,085 3.290 3.926 −6.920 25.000
Fractionalization 1,085 0.693 0.115 0.000 1.001
Polarization 1,085 1.150 0.887 −1.529 3.155
Government stability 1,085 8.089 1.659 1.000 12.133
Currency crisis 1,085 0.019 0.137 −0.440 1.000
Rich in 2009 1,085 0.720 0.449 0 1
EU membership length 1,085 2.976 10.273 0 59
Schengen 1,085 0.053 0.223 0 1
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table 7. effective number of parties modelTable 7: Eﬀective number of parties model
Dependent variable:






























Residual Std. Error 1.372 (df = 181)
F Statistic 3.766∗∗∗ (df = 12; 181)


























Table 8: Summary statistics for data used for the models in Table 7.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Eﬀective N of parties 238 4.129 1.474 1.000 11.072
Polarization (Dalton) 238 1.404 0.726 0.000 3.734
Euro 242 0.157 0.365 0 1
Membership length 242 12.996 18.051 0 59
Schengen 242 0.231 0.423 0 1
Rich in 2009 242 0.736 0.442 0 1
GDP/capita 232 24,135.650 15,914.140 2,457.340 79,002.740
Inﬂation 222 20.101 87.116 −0.836 1,058.374
Trade 232 82.565 41.156 24.170 303.454
Currency Crisis 228 0.031 0.173 0 1
Proportional representation 220 0.909 0.288 0 1
Electoral threshold 191 3.108 3.473 0.000 25.000
Post-communist 242 0.285 0.452 0 1
Post-Maastricht 242 0.653 0.477 0 1














• Costa Rica, 1983-2011
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Table 8: Summary tatistics for data used for the models in Table 7.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Eﬀective N of parties 238 4.129 1.474 1.000 11.072
Polarization (Dalton) 238 1.404 0.726 0.000 3.734
Euro 242 0.157 0.365 0 1
Membership length 242 12.996 18.051 0 59
Schengen 242 0.231 0.423 0 1
Rich in 2009 242 0.736 0.442 0 1
GDP/capita 232 24,135.650 15,914.140 2,457.340 79,002.740
Inﬂation 222 20.101 87.116 −0.836 1,058.374
Trade 232 82.565 41.156 24.170 303.454
Currency Crisis 228 0.031 0.173 0 1
Proportional representation 220 0.909 0.288 0 1
Electoral threshold 191 3.108 3.473 0.000 25.000
Post-communist 242 0.285 0.4 2 0 1
Post-Maastricht 242 0.653 0.477 0 1


















dISentanGLInG euroPe: an aSSeSSMent oF tHe IMPaCt  
oF tHe eu on PartY SYSteMS In MeMBer StateS














• Costa rica, 1983–2011
• Croatia, 2000–2012
• Cyprus, 1980–2012
• Czech republic, 1993–2012
• denmark, 1980 – 2012
• dominican republic, 1997–2012
• ecuador, 1985–1999



























• Mongolia, 1993–1994, 2010
• netherlands, 1980–2012





• Peru, 1982–3, 1990, 2003–2011





• Solomon Islands, 2006






• trinidad and tobago, 1980–2010
• turkey, 1984–2012
• united Kingdom, 1980–2012
• ukraine, 1994–2009
• united States, 1980–2012
• uruguay, 1986–9, 1997–2012
• venezuela, 1987–9
